• A single remote-controlled Ukrainian ground combat vehicle defended a “key intersection under constant adversary attack” for 45 days last summer, according to a 3rd Army Corps spokesperson who called it “Ukraine’s first fully robotic defensive operation of a position.” It likely won’t be the last.

    The robot—a Droid TW 12.7 armed with a machine gun—and its operator, some 10 kilometers away, “disrupted every attempted breakthrough and prevented enemy infiltration,” with no loss of Ukrainian life, the spokesperson said in a recent interview. 

    As the United States and other militaries work to catch up, Ukraine is putting remote-controlled air and ground systems to uses the world has never seen.

    “Drones in the air provided continuous surveillance” for the operation, the officials said. “They detected enemy movement and transmitted information in real time. Once a threat was confirmed, the operator received the signal and engaged the target with the machine gun.”

    Olena Kryzhanivska, a defense analyst who was first to report on the operation, writes that Ukrainian ground robots now perform 80 percent of logistics tasks on the front lines— from carrying explosives into enemy positions to evacuating the wounded. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense hopes to bring that up to 100 percent.

    Kryzhanivska writes that unmanned ground vehicles, which can cost $10,000 to $30,000, will soon take a much larger role in combat. 

    “There is an expectation that we might see the first encounter between Ukrainian ground drones and Russian ground drones.”

    But practical challenges stand in the way of the fully roboticized front line, the Ukrainian army spokesperson said. 

    “Battery charge is a major factor. There is never enough of it. The main solutions are either installing higher-capacity batteries on the systems or equipping each platform with two to four batteries. The same applies to ammunition load. There is never enough,” one said.

    Another hurdle is the amount of training it takes to produce a ground-robot operator.

    “Planning and executing an operation with an [unmanned ground vehicle or UGV] is significantly more difficult than, for example, operating a UAV, because the number of obstacles is substantially higher,” an official said, adding that it requires a deeper understanding of terrain, navigation, and other nuances that also bedevil self-driving cars. “It is a misconception to think that any UAV pilot can simply sit down and successfully carry out an operation with a UGV.” .

    As autonomy improves, a single soldier might be able to control multiple robots on different missions. But Ukraine limits what its lethal robots can do.

    “Ukrainian forces are still operating in the territories that are populated by civilians. There are children. They are elderly. So just giving ground robots that ability to make decisions, to engage, to strike and kill, that would be a very dangerous development, and Ukrainians are against that,” Kryzhanivska said.

    The Ukrainian officials emphasized that humans will remain part of the decision-making process. 

    “Everything that happens in war must be controlled and coordinated by a soldier. The missions performed by our systems carry a high level of responsibility,” one said.

    Still, new concepts of “predictive intelligence” could enable ground drones to make more decisions as part of a network of sensors and intelligence nodes. They might, for example, predict where or how enemy forces might move in order to get into position.

    It’s a concept that Lt. Col. Eric Sturzinger, who leads research and engagements at the Army’s Artificial Intelligence Integration Center, is exploring via the Tactical Joint Embedding Predictive Architecture, or JEPA—a framework to enable drones to predict how adversaries might plan an attack, potentially making ground robot operations even more effective.

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  • Days after U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran began on Feb. 28, 2026, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez denied American forces the use of the Naval Station Rota and the Morón Air Base – installations that had hosted U.S. troops for more than 70 years.

    “We are a sovereign country that does not wish to take part in illegal wars,” Sánchez said. U.S. President Donald Trump responded by threatening a full trade embargo against Spain.

    Weeks later, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni – Trump’s closest European ally and the only EU head of government invited to his second inauguration – broke publicly with Washington.

    “When we don’t agree, we must say it,” she said. “And this time, we do not agree.” Rome then refused to refuel U.S. bombers at a base in southern Italy.

    These are not minor diplomatic frictions. As a scholar of alliance politics and nuclear security, I see something much larger than a tactical disagreement. The Iran war’s most consequential casualty may not be in Tehran. It may be American credibility as an ally, and with it, the trans-Atlantic alliance itself.

    The Iraq comparison misleads

    The initial U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran were launched with virtually no advance consultation with European allies. The Trump administration treated NATO partners not as participants in strategic decision-making but as logistical infrastructure to be commandeered or punished for refusing assistance.

    European governments, even those most invested with the U.S., declined to join the campaign. The Trump administration has responded with the embargo threat against Spain and the withdrawal of 5,000 U.S. troops from Germany.

    “The U.S.A. will REMEMBER!!!” Trump posted on Truth Social on March 31, 2026.

    The reflex in Washington has been to read this as a rerun of 2003, when France and Germany opposed the Iraq War. In January 2003, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld dismissed France and Germany as “old Europe” while courting the postcommunist “new Europe,” including Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary.

    On the surface, the parallel is tempting: a unilateral American war in the Middle East, European refusal to participate, trans-Atlantic recriminations.

    But the comparison conceals more than it reveals. In 2003, the United States wanted Europe in its coalition. The George W. Bush administration sought United Nations authorization, courted allies and treated European refusal as a problem to be managed.

    In 2026, the Trump administration explicitly does not want European input. It views allies as freeloaders and threatens them with economic coercion. It treats their hesitation as cause for retribution rather than negotiation.

    The deeper difference is structural. In 2003, the trans-Atlantic alliance still rested on shared commitments to collective defense, open trade and an international, rules-based order.

    Today, the Trump administration does not share the commitments that traditionally bound the United States to its European partners, whether on NATO, the Russia-Ukraine war, or the rules governing trade and migration.

    The shared values that papered over the Iraq disagreement in 2003, and that allowed President Nicolas Sarkozy to reintegrate France into NATO’s command by 2009, are no longer there to do the work of repair.

    The April 2026 collapse of Viktor Orbán’s 16-year rule in Hungary left Trump without a serious political ally among major European governments.

    The real precedent is Suez

    A more illuminating precedent lies further back. In 1956, Britain and France went to war with Egypt over the Suez Canal, in coordination with Israel, concealing their plans from the Eisenhower administration. Washington responded by threatening to crash the British pound, forcing London and Paris into humiliating retreat.

    The crisis is remembered as the moment Britain accepted that it was no longer an independent great power.

    But its more important legacy was strategic. Suez exposed the depth of Europe’s dependence on the United States. That humiliation drove Charles de Gaulle’s pursuit of an independent French nuclear deterrent. It also accelerated European integration and planted the recognition that genuine strategic autonomy would be a generational project.

    The Iran war inverts the conditions of that lesson. In 1956, Europeans learned that they could not act independently of Washington. In 2026, they are learning that they cannot rely on Washington’s consent being available, and that the U.S. will act without them, against their stated interests and at their economic expense.

    The pattern is the same: Dependence on the U.S. is unsustainable, and autonomous capacity is no longer optional. What has changed is that Europe is now willing to use the financial, economic and military tools it has long possessed in ways it would not have considered before.

    The EU’s €90 billion joint-debt loan to Ukraine signals an autonomous European strategic stance. So do discussions of activating the bloc’s anti-coercion trade instrument against U.S. tariffs, France’s nuclear arsenal expansion and offers to “Europeanize” deterrence.

    The strategic postures were debated for decades. The Iran war is making them operational.

    This is not yet European strategic independence. Europe remains militarily reliant on U.S. air defense, satellite capacity and intelligence.

    The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, for example, has forced an uncomfortable energy reckoning with American liquefied natural gas, Russian pipelines, Middle Eastern hydrocarbons and Chinese-dominated renewable supply chains. None of the available paths to energy security run through trusted partners.

    France and Germany still disagree on nearly every detail of how integration should proceed. But the political condition for autonomy, a shared European belief that Washington can no longer be trusted to share strategic decision-making, has crystallized in a way that no previous crisis produced.

    The post-1945 trans-Atlantic bargain traded U.S. security guarantees for European deference on global strategy. Iraq 2003 strained that bargain. Trump’s first term cracked it, and the Iran war has broken it.

    What replaces it will not be a renewed partnership. It will be a parallel relationship between two powers with sometimes overlapping interests and, increasingly, separate strategic horizons.

    In 1956, Europe learned how dependent it was on Washington. In 2026, it is learning that dependence is no longer sustainable.

    Eleni Lomtatidze, a student in the International Relations Program at the University of Pennsylvania and at SciencesPo Paris, contributed to this story.

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  • Torrance, United States / California, May 19th, 2026, CyberNewswire Criminal IP has announced its return to Infosecurity Europe 2026 with a focus on delivering more actionable, decision-ready intelligence through its continuously evolving platform. Taking place from June 2 to June 4 at ExCeL London, one of Europe’s most influential cybersecurity events will once again bring […]

    The post Criminal IP Returns to Infosecurity Europe 2026 with Advanced AI-Driven TI & ASM appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.

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  • Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a new ad fraud and malvertising operation dubbed Trapdoor targeting Android device users. The activity, per HUMAN’s Satori Threat Intelligence and Research Team, encompassed 455 malicious Android apps and 183 threat actor-owned command-and-control (C2) domains, turning the infrastructure into a pipeline for multi-stage fraud. “Users

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  • Why do maintenance teams struggle? Is it because they lack skills? Or do they need more advanced resources?…

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  • Cybersecurity researchers successfully demonstrated 47 unique zero-day exploits at Pwn2Own Berlin 2026, targeting major enterprise software and AI platforms.

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  • New York, United States, May 19th, 2026, CyberNewswire New research shows identity dark matter continues to expand and erode enterprise identity, resulting in a fragile foundation for agent AI readiness and adoption Orchid Security, the company solving identity at its core, today released its Identity Gap: 2026 Snapshot report, revealing that the majority of enterprise […]

    The post Two-Thirds of Nonhuman Accounts Are Unseen and Unmanaged, According to Orchid Security’s Identity Gap Report appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.

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  • Proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code has now been released for a recently patched security flaw in the Linux kernel that could allow for local privilege escalation (LPE). Dubbed DirtyDecrypt (aka DirtyCBC), the vulnerability was discovered and reported by the Zellic and V12 security team on May 9, 2026, only to be informed by the maintainers that it was a duplicate of a vulnerability that had

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  • Torrance, United States / California, 19th May 2026, CyberNewswire

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  • New York, United States, 19th May 2026, CyberNewswire

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