The Trump administration’s retreat from programs that track foreign influence operations has weakened various cross-sector relationships used to identify and confront those campaigns as midterm elections fast approach — even as artificial intelligence makes those operations easier to deploy — multiple sources told Nextgov/FCW.

State officials say they are receiving fewer election-specific federal briefings than in previous cycles, while others who track foreign influence have observed routine exchanges with government and technology companies fall away. Some also note that federal workforce departures have weakened cooperation with outside partners, including social media platforms, to track false information online.

While the federal government continues to gather intelligence on foreign threats to U.S. elections, some of those who lean on those findings say federal agencies are less reliably sharing information with non-federal researchers and state officials responsible for countering those campaigns. That cooperation began to weaken before President Donald Trump returned to office, and his administration has since dismantled several programs dedicated to countering the problem.

This story is based on interviews with current and former federal officials, state election officials and specialists in cybersecurity and influence operations. Several people spoke on the condition of anonymity to be candid about their views and for fear of retribution. Their concerns come as fast-evolving AI tools now allow foreign influence operators to do more than just generate fake images or audio, instead helping them produce plausible-sounding messages, find audiences to target and autonomously adjust campaigns at a scale not seen before.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency referred questions about foreign malign influence to the Justice Department, saying that influence operations fall outside CISA’s mission. DOJ did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

“Election security is national security, and protecting our critical infrastructure remains a top priority for the Trump Administration, DHS, and CISA,” a CISA spokesperson said. “CISA works closely with intelligence and law enforcement partners to monitor threats to U.S. critical infrastructure, including election infrastructure.”

The spokesperson added that the agency is committed to supporting state and local election officials “to protect election infrastructure and safeguard our democracy.”

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence did not respond to a request for comment.

Foreign influence operations aim to shape what people believe and how they act, often without revealing who is behind the message. Around elections, that can mean spreading false voting information, stoking political divisions or casting doubt on results. Such messages can be harder to question when they appear to come from or be amplified by fellow Americans and reinforce views people already hold.

One election nonprofit official told Nextgov/FCW that, during the November 2024 election, they received an early-morning text from a colleague in Georgia asking about bomb threats at voting sites, which U.S. officials later deemed may have been tied to Russia. The official was sitting in CISA’s election operations room. Finding out whether other jurisdictions were facing similar threats meant simply walking across the room and asking federal personnel.

“Any time you have federal support to help connect the dots, it’s a game-changer,” the official said, noting that they have not been alerted to or invited to a CISA elections operations room for the coming midterms. 

The CISA spokesperson said that, before and during Election Day, the agency will “activate an Incident Coordination Group to establish a unified operational picture, rapidly share critical information, coordinate essential services for stakeholders in the field and strengthen incident response within its mission and authorities.”

Bret Schafer, senior director of policy and research for information operations at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, said efforts to bring government, technology companies and researchers together grew during Trump’s first term, after Russia’s interference attempts in the 2016 election exposed gaps in their understanding of foreign campaigns.

Each could see activity the others could not. Sharing those findings helped them recognize operations that might otherwise go unnoticed, Schafer said last week on a panel at a national-security law conference hosted by the American Bar Association.

Those routine exchanges with the government have become harder to sustain. Now, “civil society is out on both sides,” he said, adding that he had gone at least two years without an information-sharing conversation with a relevant technology company, and a couple of years without one involving the government.

Much of that cooling began in the Biden administration, when GOP litigation over federal interactions with social media companies made participants more cautious. The Trump administration has gone further. It shuttered CISA work focused on election disinformation, disbanded the FBI’s Foreign Influence Task Force and closed the State Department’s office for countering foreign information threats, all largely on censorship grounds. The ODNI Foreign Malign Influence Center also faced a similar fate last August under then-director Tulsi Gabbard.

An office can retain its responsibilities while losing the relationships that helped it do the work, according to a person familiar with U.S. efforts to address influence operations. But someone who once knew exactly whom to call may find that their counterpart has departed, or that the people still there are unsure whether leadership supports exchanging information.

One current U.S. official described an environment that puts less public emphasis on election security at CISA and across the Department of Homeland Security than in previous cycles, with greater attention to other critical infrastructure matters, including water systems. 

The official speculated that employees could hesitate to highlight their election security work after seeing others who worked on elections lose their jobs, though they noted they had not heard staff express that fear directly. The official also acknowledged that midterms generally receive less attention than presidential elections.

The administration has maintained that federal support continues. ODNI has assigned officials to coordinate election threat intelligence, while CISA outlined election support plans last month. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth also directed Cyber Command and military intelligence agencies to prioritize foreign election threats and coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security last month. 

A current Defense Department analyst argued that closing offices focused on tracking influence operations does not necessarily erase expertise, because personnel can continue the work elsewhere in government or as contractors. But it’s unclear how much of that work has continued, or whether those who left government still have access to relevant information and federal contacts they once relied on.

The analyst recalled a strong working relationship with Meta, which operates Facebook and Instagram, when they worked on those issues around two years ago. The analyst could not say whether those exchanges continue today. 

Similarly, one former U.S. official recalled preparations for the 2020 election beginning roughly a year before Americans went to vote, with coordination growing more frequent as Election Day approached. Some calls included 80 to 100 participants, including private companies, discussing topics that included ballot security and broadcasting accurate voting information.

“Our nation’s security is best protected when private individuals, private sector, industry and government work together toward a common goal to protect our freedom and way of life, and that includes reporting suspicious and illegal activity and leveraging legal access and authorities to protect the American people and interests,” Erin Joe, special counsel at Wiley Rein LLP and a former senior FBI executive, told Nextgov/FCW in an interview.

At the ABA conference, former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff argued that the government still has a role in helping people recognize deception. Officials can explain where a message came from or show that a supposed recording was generated by AI, without telling people which political views to accept.

“It is fighting bad speech with good speech,” Chertoff said.

A TikTok spokesperson referred Nextgov/FCW to a webpage outlining steps the company is taking to prepare for midterms and disrupt covert influence operations on its platform. Several other social media companies and AI firms — including Meta, X, Anthropic and OpenAI — did not respond to requests for comment.

Two state election officials described how their offices are responding to misleading information while receiving fewer election-specific federal briefings than in previous cycles.

One said identifying who is behind false messages can be difficult. Their office often focuses on information that could confuse people about when, where and how to vote, as well as threats to election workers.

When a misleading claim surfaces, communications staff and leadership decide whether responding would help voters or draw more attention to something that might otherwise fade away. Threats to election officials are referred to law enforcement, the official said.

The same official said they had not received an election-specific federal briefing “in quite some time,” although they attend regularly held CISA calls about software vulnerabilities and known flaws being exploited by hackers. Those discussions offer little information that is specific to elections, the official said. Monthly meetings through the state’s fusion center still bring together state, local and federal law enforcement to discuss threats to election officials.

The second official said their office sends a representative to federal election-threat briefings whenever they are available, but those briefings have occurred less frequently than in 2024.

That official nevertheless described their election offices as better prepared than in past years, with multiple backup plans, in case disruptions occur.

“We hope that we don’t have to use them. But if we do, they’re there,” the official said.

Those preparations come as AI has lowered the cost and effort required to conduct influence campaigns. AI has played a key role in helping to run these operations, from writing posts and distributing them to studying how people respond, said Snehal Antani, CEO and co-founder of cybersecurity company Horizon3.ai. Operators can test different messages and use the results to adjust their approach, and AI agents can automate much of that work, reducing the time and expertise it once required, he said.

“AI has dramatically reduced the skills required and dramatically accelerated the speed at which this cycle can be executed,” Antani said.

Another former U.S. official added that increasingly capable, downloadable open-source models allow smaller actors to undertake work that once required substantial investment and specialized engineering.

“The barrier to entry is much lower,” the former official said, adding that AI-generated text can blend into everyday online conversations and make it harder to spot than a manipulated image or video with visible flaws.

Russia is more likely to pursue more obvious inflammatory messaging this cycle, while China’s efforts may be more covert to serve longer-term objectives, said another current official, adding that both are expected to make greater use of AI. Pro-Iran outfits have especially leveraged AI more overtly in recent months amid the war that began in late February.

But the official cautioned that more powerful AI tools and more convincing content do not necessarily mean a foreign operation is changing how people vote. An image or video getting lots of views does not mean people believe it or will vote differently because of it, they added.

In some cases, an influence campaign may not even target eligible voters. For instance, content aimed at younger Americans could sway their political stances, but they may not be of legal age to cast a ballot. 

And in other settings, a foreign influence operation may not be needed for an American to vote a certain way. 

“If I see gas is $7 a gallon, I don’t necessarily need a lot more to go vote blue,” the official said, referring to California voters who have faced record-high fuel prices in some parts of the state.

These foreign threats come as political campaigns at home have increasingly used AI in their advertisements.

The growing use of AI-generated political videos could also make it harder to distinguish real footage from fabricated material, according to research released Wednesday by cybersecurity firm Check Point.

“Video is one of the easier ways to make a claim feel real, since people tend to trust what they can see and hear for themselves,” the company’s findings say. As AI-generated political content becomes more common, it becomes harder for voters to “trust that a video of a candidate is real” and easier for anyone “to dismiss a real video as fake.”

The scale and sophistication of false information today “makes our sensitivity to it a little bit more dull than perhaps in years past,” said Kimberly Kearney, a former CIA case officer.

“We as individuals have to have the desire to know whether what we’re consuming is true or false, or if it feeds into a narrative that is convenient or more comfortable for us,” she said in an interview. “So it starts with that cognitive honesty and awareness to want to know whether what you’re consuming is accurate or if it could have a bias to it.”

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